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I. INTRODUCTION
Virtually nonexistent until the aftermath of World War II, 1
government-funded foreign humanitarian aid has become a significant
part of United States foreign policy. 2 The United States allocates
billions of dollars to foreign humanitarian aid annually. In fiscal year 3
2011, the United States obligated 4 approximately $31.7 billion dollars
in bilateral 5 economic assistance. In calendar year 6 2011, the United
States disbursed 7 $3.7 billion through multilateral 8 organizations. 9
1. The rebuilding of Europe after World War II via the Marshall Plan is cited
as the beginning of foreign aid. MARIAN LAWSON & CURT TARNOFF, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R40213, FOREIGN AID: AN INTRODUCTION TO U.S. PROGRAMS
AND POLICY 2 (2011); Steven J. Wiese, Note, U.S. Foreign Aid Reform: Changing
Institutional Problems in Order to Meet Modern Day Needs, 8 WASH. U. GLOBAL
STUD. L. REV. 747, 747-48 (2009).
2. See LAWSON & TARNOFF, supra note 1, at 2; see also Wiese, supra note 1,
at 747-55 (discussing the evolution of U.S. government-funded foreign humanitarian
aid); Andrew S. Natsios, Foreign Aid Programs Are Important for American
National Security, U.S. NEWS (Oct. 11, 2011), http://www.usnews.com/debateclub/given-the-current-deficit-crisis-should-foreign-aid-be-cut/foreign-aidprograms-are-important-for-american-national-security (noting that “nearly every
American president since WWII . . . has supported a robust [foreign] aid program”);
Carol Adelman, Foreign Aid Effectively Advancing Security Interests, HARVARD
INT’L
REV.,
Fall
2007,
at
62-63,
available
at
http://gpr.hudson.org/files/publications/Harvard %20Review%20-%20Adelman.pdf
(discussing the “two rationales” for U.S. foreign aid: “economic development and
US national security”).
3. The U.S. defines a fiscal year as beginning on October 1 and ending on
September 30. U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Glossary of Terms, USAID,
http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/about/glossary.html (last updated Jan. 2013). Each
fiscal year is “designated by the calendar year in which it ends.” Id.
4. An obligation is “[a] binding agreement that will result in outlays,
immediately or in the future.” Id.
5. U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Foreign Assistance Fast Facts, USAID,
http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/data/fast-facts.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2013).
“Bilateral aid is aid provided directly by a donor country to a recipient country.”
Sophie Smyth, World Bank Grants in a Changed World Order: How Do We Referee
This New Paradigm?, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 483, 497 (2008); 1-A H.R. COMM. ON
INT’L REL. & S. COMM. ON FOREIGN REL., 108TH CONG., LEGISLATION ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS THROUGH 2002, at 23 (J. Comm. Print 2003) (discussing how bilateral
assistance should be used for projects without “large-scale capital transfers”). The
majority of American bilateral aid is administered by the U.S. Agency for
International Development. LAWSON & TARNOFF, supra note 1, at 21.
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Following the State Department’s conceptual “framework,” the
Congressional Research Service separates American foreign aid into
“five strategic objectives.” 10 “Humanitarian [aid]” is one of those
objectives. 11 This Note’s definition of humanitarian aid is broader
than the one used by the Congressional Research Service. Rather, this
Note defines humanitarian aid as
unilateral transfers of U.S. resources (funds, goods, and services)
by the U.S. Government to or for the benefit of foreign entities
(including international and regional organizations) without any
reciprocal payment or transfer of resources from the foreign
entities . . . . [It] is not just confined to funds or commodities, [but]
also includes the provision of technical assistance, capacity
building, training, education, and other services, as well as the
direct costs required to implement foreign assistance. 12

6. A calendar year begins on January 1 and ends on December 31. CAL. TAX
SERV.
CTR.,
Calendar
Year
vs.
Fiscal
Year,
CA.GOV,
http://www.taxes.ca.gov/Small_Business_Assistance_Center/Calendar/jan.shtml
(last visited Mar. 9, 2013).
7. Disbursements are the amounts the U.S. pays through its federal agencies
“during the fiscal year to liquidate its obligations.” U.S. Overseas Loans and
Grants: Foreign Assistance Fast Facts, supra note 5, at 1.
8. 1-A H.R. COMM. ON INT’L REL. & S. COMM. ON FOREIGN REL., 108TH
CONG., supra note 5, at 23 (stating that projects involving “large-scale capital
transfers” should be disbursed “with contributions from other countries working
together in a multilateral framework”). “Multilateral aid serves many of the same
objectives as bilateral developmental assistance, although through different
channels.” LAWSON & TARNOFF, supra note 1, at 3.
9. U.S. Official Development Assistance (ODA) Fast Facts: CY2011, U.S.
OFFICIAL DEV. ASSISTANCE DATABASE, http://usoda.eads.usaidallnet.gov/data/
fast_facts.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2013).
10. LAWSON & TARNOFF, supra note 1, at 3. The five objectives are “Peace
and Security; Investing in People; Governing Justly and Democratically; Economic
Growth; and Humanitarian Assistance.” Id.; see generally Wiese, supra note 1, at
754 (discussing the evolution of U.S. foreign aid).
11. LAWSON & TARNOFF, supra note 1, at 3, 6 (“Humanitarian assistance
responds to both natural and man-made disasters as well as problems resulting from
conflict associated with failed or failing states.”).
12. Frequently
Asked
Questions:
General
Information,
FOREIGNASSISTANCE.GOV, http://foreignassistance.gov/FAQ.aspx (last visited Feb.
12, 2013). Humanitarian assistance has also been defined as “assistance to meet
humanitarian needs, including needs for food, medicine, medical supplies and
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The United States currently provides humanitarian aid 13 in response to
“natural and manmade disasters” and conflicts in “failing or failed
states.” 14 It also provides foreign humanitarian aid in response to
human rights abuses, 15 to “promot[e] economic growth and reduc[e]
poverty, . . . address[] population growth, expand[] access to basic
education and health care, protect[] the environment, promot[e]
stability in conflictive regions, . . . [and to] promot[e] trade.” 16
The constitutional authority to spend taxpayer dollars on foreign
humanitarian aid has never been seriously questioned. 17 Most
challenges have addressed whether government-funded foreign
humanitarian aid is good policy. 18 Rarely is government-funded
foreign humanitarian aid analyzed in terms of its constitutionality, as
this Note does.
Under the Constitution, Congress only has the authority to spend
for the “common [d]efense” and “general [w]elfare” of the United
States. 19 Foreign humanitarian aid does not qualify. In the words of
Justice Story, the Constitution is “‘of special and enumerated powers,

equipment, education, and clothing” and the provision of mental and physical
healthcare and shelter. 1-A H.R. COMM. ON INT’L REL. & S. COMM. ON FOREIGN
REL., 108TH CONG., supra note 5, at 224-25; LAWSON & TARNOFF, supra note 1, at
23-24 (noting forms of aid include cash, equipment, food, economic infrastructure,
training, expertise, and small grants).
13. Black’s Law Dictionary uses the term “humanitarian intervention” rather
than humanitarian aid. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 897 (9th ed. 2009).
14. LAWSON & TARNOFF, supra note 1, at 6.
15. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 897 (9th ed. 2009).
16. LAWSON & TARNOFF, supra note 1, at 3.
17. See Wiese, supra note 1, at 747.
18. See, e.g., Doug Bandow, Foreign Aid and International Crises, THE
FREEMAN (Dec. 1, 1996), http://www.fee.org/the_freeman/detail/foreign-aid-andinternational-crises/#axzz2NqrzGdPO (discussing how foreign assistance has failed
to accomplish its goals and contributes to the survival of brutal regimes); U.S. Aid by
the Numbers, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (July 31, 2008),
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/news/2008/07/31/4673/u-s-aidby-the-numbers/.
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The original text of the U.S. Constitution
spells “defense” as “defence.” This was the proper spelling when the Constitution
was drafted. However, this Note will spell the word with an “s” because that is
consistent with its current spelling.
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and not of general and unlimited powers.’” 20 Specifically, the
“‘power to lay taxes for the common defen[s]e and general welfare of
the United States is not in common sense a general power. It is
limited to those objects. It cannot constitutionally transcend them.’” 21
This Note focuses on the unconstitutionality of governmentfunded foreign humanitarian aid, arguing that foreign humanitarian
aid is neither for the “common [d]efense” nor the “general [w]elfare”
of the United States. 22 What is for the common defense and general
welfare of the United States is limited to those powers enumerated in
Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution. Furthermore, even if
government-funded foreign humanitarian aid were found not to be
limited to those enumerated powers, congressional authority to tax and
spend is limited to the common defense and general welfare of the
United States. There are three reasons why foreign humanitarian aid
does not meet either of these two requirements. First, any connection
between bilateral foreign humanitarian aid and the welfare and
defense of the United States is unproven and attenuated. Second,
there is no connection between foreign humanitarian aid through
multilateral organizations and the welfare and defense of the United
States. Third, neither bilateral nor multilateral foreign humanitarian
aid serves any purpose directly related to the defense and welfare of
the United States. Finally, this Note contends that Congress ignores
its constitutional limitations when it comes to foreign humanitarian
aid chiefly because of the powerful emotions that human suffering
elicits. While emotions justify private humanitarian aid, emotions do
not justify unconstitutional government spending.
II. METHODS AND CANONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
There are various competing sources of legal textual
interpretation. 23 The two interpretive theories that have come to the

20. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936) (quoting 1 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 909 (5th ed.
1905)).
21. Id. (quoting 1 STORY, supra note 20, § 922).
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
23. Jack L. Landau, Some Thoughts About State Constitutional Interpretation,
115 PENN. ST. L. REV. 837, 851 (2011).
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forefront in recent times are Originalism 24 and Evolving
Constitutionalism.25 Originalists restrict constitutional interpretation
to the Framers’ words and the assumptions of their era. 26 Evolving
Constitutionalists interpret the Constitution to reflect changes in law
and society. 27 Both Originalists and Evolving Constitutionalists first
look to the text of the Constitution when analyzing whether something
is constitutional. 28 Here the similarities in interpretive methods end.
If the text’s meaning is unclear, Originalists look to the legal and
social tradition of the text’s time. 29 Evolving Constitutionalists do
not. 30 Instead, Evolving Constitutionalists look to the prevailing
morality or social consensus and “mega-conceptions” of justice of
their own time. 31
Evolving Constitutionalists are critical of Originalism. 32 They
claim that the Framers expected the interpretation of their words

24. GLENN C. SMITH & PATRICIA FUSCO, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR
DUMMIES 44-46 (2012).
25. Id. at 47-48. Evolving Constitutionalism is also referred to as belief in a
“[l]iving Constitution.” See RON PAUL, THE REVOLUTION: A MANIFESTO 48-49
(2008).
26. SMITH & FUSCO, supra note 24, at 44. The era for constitutional
interpretation refers to the time the Framers of the text adopted the text. This Note
focuses on the Bill of Rights and references the Articles of Confederation. The
Framers of the Bill of Rights were James Madison and others in the First Federal
Congress in 1789. Id. at 45. The Framers of the Articles of Confederation were the
men from the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention in 1777. Id.
27. Id. at 44; see also Landau, supra note 23, at 854-55. Evolving
Constitutionalists argue that because the “Framers intended the [Constitution] to
serve as a general charter,” “constitutional interpretation must be informed by
contemporary norms and circumstances, not simply by its original meaning.”
GOODWIN LIU, PAMELA S. KARLAN & CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER, AM. CONST.
SOC’Y FOR LAW & POL’Y, KEEPING FAITH WITH THE CONSTITUTION 25 (2009).
28. SMITH & FUSCO, supra note 24, at 45-47.
29. See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The
Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws
(Mar. 8 & 9, 1995), in THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES, at 79, 112-20
(1995), available at http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures//_documents/a-toz/s/scalia97.pdf; see also SMITH & FUSCO, supra note 24, at 45-47.
30. SMITH & FUSCO, supra note 24, at 47.
31. Id.; see also Landau, supra note 23, at 854-55.
32. See Landau, supra note 23, at 852-55.
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would evolve over time. 33 This Note demonstrates that this assertion
does not find much support in history. For example, Daniel Webster34
opined that “‘[w]e must take the meaning of the Constitution as it has
been solemnly fixed.’” 35 Alexander Hamilton’s writings support his
belief in an Originalist approach. 36 William Blackstone was also an

33. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 79 (2012); see also Scalia, supra note 29, at 112.
Ron Paul notes that a “living” Constitution is something any government would
want because whenever people claimed the government overstepped its
constitutional authority, the government could claim the Constitution had evolved.
PAUL, supra note 25, at 49; see also Joseph P. Viteritti, A Truly Living Constitution:
Why Educational Opportunity Trumps Strict Separation on the Voucher Question,
57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 89, 89 (2000) (quoting Justice William Brennan as
saying that “[T]he genius of the Constitution rests not in any static meaning it might
have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its great
principles to cope with current problems and current needs”) (alteration in original);
LIU ET AL., supra note 27, at 25 (noting that Evolving Constitutionalists believe the
Constitution was intended to “grow and evolve” to reflect the changing “conditions,
needs, and values of our society”).
34. Daniel Webster served in Congress and was Secretary of State in both the
early 1840s and early 1850s. PAUL, supra note 25, at 56.
35. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 33, at 80 (quoting DANIEL WEBSTER, THE
WORKS OF DANIEL WEBSTER 164 (1851)).
36. THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The rules of legal
interpretation are rules of common sense, adopted by the courts in the construction
of the laws. The true test, therefore, of a just application of them is its conformity to
the source from which they are derived.”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 84
(Alexander Hamilton) (“For why declare that things shall not be done which there is
no power to do? Why, for instance, should it be said that the liberty of the press
shall not be restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions may be
imposed? I will not contend that such a provision would confer a regulating power;
but it is evident that it would furnish, to men disposed to usurp, a plausible pretense
for claiming that power. They might urge with a semblance of reason, that the
Constitution ought not to be charged with the absurdity of providing against the
abuse of an authority which was not given, and that the provision against restraining
the liberty of the press afforded a clear implication, that a power to prescribe proper
regulations concerning it was intended to be vested in the national government.”).
These quotations demonstrate Hamilton’s Originalist stance. He was worried that a
Bill of Rights would result in people interpreting the Constitution so as to grant the
federal government powers it did not have. After all, why grant freedoms (e.g.,
through a Bill of Rights), if the federal government does not have the power to
restrain those freedoms?
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Originalist. 37 As were James Madison, 38 Cesare Beccaria, 39 Supreme
Court Justice David Brewer, 40 Chief Justice Roger Taney, 41 Thomas
Jefferson, 42 and Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black. 43
37. William Blackstone (1723-1780) was an 18th-century English jurist.
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 33, at 79-80; see also Sir William Blackstone,
ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA,
available
at
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/68589/Sir-William-Blackstone
(last
visited Mar. 29, 2013). Blackstone’s belief in Originalism was evident when he
discussed an 11th-century law that forbid all “ecclesiastical persons to ‘purchase
provisions at Rome.’” SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 33, at 79-80 (quoting 1
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 60 (4th ed.,
1770)). Blackstone noted that those words “‘might seem to prohibit the buying of
grain or other victual.’” Id. However, such an interpretation is incorrect because
“provisions” in the eleventh century referred to ecclesiastical-office appointments.
Id. Therefore, giving “provision” any other meaning would be incorrect. Id.
38. James Madison, one of the Constitution’s architects and an author of the
Bill of Rights, questioned how laws could be fixed in their meaning and operation if
the meaning of the Constitution was not. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 33, at 80
(quoting Letter from James Madison to C.E. Haynes (Feb. 25, 1821)).
39. “Cesare Beccaria, the . . . son of an Italian nobleman, published a short
treatise, Dei delitti e delle pene, that was translated into English as On Crimes and
Punishments.” John D. Bessler, Revisiting Beccaria’s Vision: The Enlightenment,
America’s Death Penalty, and the Abolition Movement, 4 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y
195, 196 (2009). He influenced many thinkers, including the American Founding
Fathers as his writings “profoundly shaped the country’s founding era and the Bill of
Rights.” Id. at 207.
When the code of laws is once fixed, it should be observed in the literal
sense, and nothing more is left to the judge, than to determine, whether an
action be, or be not conformable to the written law. When the rule of
right, which ought to direct the actions of the philosopher, as well as the
ignorant, is a matter of controversy, not of fact, the people are slaves to the
magistrates.
CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT 24 (Henry Paolucci trans., 1963)
(4th ed. 1793).
40. See South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448 (1905) (“The
Constitution is a written instrument. As such its meaning does not alter. That which
it meant when adopted, it means now.”).
41. See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 425-26 (1856) (“[A]s it is a
Government of special, delegated, powers, no authority beyond . . . can be
constitutionally exercised.”).
42. See GEORGE FRATER, OUR HUMANIST HERITAGE 126-27 (2010) (“‘The
Constitution on which our Union rests, shall be administered by me [as President]
according to the safe and honest meaning contemplated by the plain understanding
of the people of the United States at the time of its adoption — a meaning to be
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Furthermore, if the Constitution were intended to evolve,
including an amendment to change the Constitution would be
superfluous. 44
For example, the Thirteenth and Nineteenth
Amendments would have been unnecessary. 45 In the words of
Alexander Hamilton, “the present Constitution is the standard to
which we are to cling. Under its banners, . . . must we combat our
political foes—rejecting all changes but through the channel itself
provides for amendments.” 46
According to some, Originalism is the only method of
interpretation compatible with democracy. 47 Giving legal texts new
meaning is changing the law. 48 Another word for change is amend. 49

found in the explanations of those who advocated, not those who opposed it, and
who opposed it merely lest the construction should be applied which they denounced
as possible.’”) (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Mesrs. Eddy, Russel,
Thurber, Wheaton and Smith (Mar. 27, 1801)). Thomas Jefferson’s Originalist
stance is important because Jefferson was the principal author of the Declaration of
Independence. The fact that Congress appointed Jefferson as one of five men to
draft this document is demonstrative of the respect Jefferson engendered.
FATHERS,
available
at
FOUNDING
http://www.smithsonianeducation.org/spotlight/july4.html; THOMAS JEFFERSON
HIST.
CENT.,
available
at
(1743-1826),
AM.
http://www.americanhistorycentral.com/entry.php?rec=453.
43. Justice Hugo Black is cited as the most prominent Originalist from the
1940s through the 1960s. DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 8 (2010).
His belief in an Originalist interpretation is noteworthy because of his “liberalhumanist-individualistic philosophy.” Raymond G. Decker, Justice Hugo L. Black:
The Balancer of Absolutes, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 1335, 1344 (1971).
44. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. Evolving Constitutionalists deny this
assertion. Citing changes to population and technology as examples, they claim
that, because the process of amending the Constitution is lengthy and difficult, it is
unrealistic to expect this process to keep up with the frequent changes to U.S.
society. See STRAUSS, supra note 43, at 8-9.
45. If the Constitution were intended to evolve with society, constitutional
amendments would have been unnecessary to give African Americans and women
the right to vote. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 33, at 80-81.
46. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James A. Bayard (April 1802), in 10
THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, at 434 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., G.P.
Putnam’s
Sons
1904)
(emphasis
added),
available
at
http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Fti
tle=1387&chapter=93528&layout=html&Itemid=27.
47. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 33, at 82-85.
48. Id. at 82.
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To amend the Constitution, however, requires compliance with the
Fifth Amendment. 50 For these reasons, and because Evolving
Constitutionalists believe the Constitution “must keep changing in its
application or lose even its original meaning,” 51 this Note largely
focuses on the Originalist method of interpreting the Constitution.
Consistent with the Originalist method of interpretation is the use
of interpretative canons. 52 These interpretative canons are not found
within any one source. 53 Rather, they are gathered from various legal
sources. 54 A canon of construction “guides the interpreter of a text on
some phase of the interpretive process.” 55 Some of these canons will
be used throughout this Note to interpret relevant parts of the
Constitution to show that Congress does not have the constitutional
authority to spend tax revenue for foreign humanitarian aid.
III. GRAMMAR AND USAGE DEMONSTRATE CONGRESSIONAL
AUTHORITY TO TAX AND SPEND IS LIMITED TO ENUMERATED
PURPOSES
Government-funded foreign humanitarian aid is unconstitutional
because it does not fall within the enumerated powers of Congress,
which limit what is for the general welfare and common defense. 56

49. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 94 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “amend” as “[t]o
change the wording of; specif., to formally alter . . . by striking out, inserting, or
substituting words.”).
50. See PAUL, supra note 25, at 45-46 (discussing the Founders’ concern that
there would always be temptation to take more power than the Constitution
authorized and the time consuming process of amending the Constitution increased
this temptation to just take the power without amending the Constitution); see also
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
51. Adam Winkler, A Revolution Too Soon: Woman Suffragists and the
‘Living Constitution’, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1456, 1463 (2001).
52. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 33, at 78-79.
53. Id. at 9 (discussing that this book is arguably the first modern attempt to
compile and arrange valid canons and explain their validity).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 426.
56. See e.g., PAUL, supra note 25, at 44 (noting that Article I, Section 8
provides an exhaustive list of congressional powers).
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This conclusion is supported by the grammar and usage of Article I,
Section 8, of the Constitution. 57
Semicolons may be used “between items in a list that already
involve commas.” 58 The use of the semicolons in Article I, Section 8,
“preserves the unity of the clause” and the “true intention of the
parties to the Constitution.” 59 It preserves the clause’s unity because
it unites two parts in one substantive clause. 60 The first part of the
clause gives Congress the power “[t]o lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises” and is called the “first” part of a “single”
clause. 61 The second part limits and explains what is in the general
welfare and for the common defense of the United States. 62 The
limiting and explanatory nature of the second part of the clause is thus
supported by the clause’s structure. The remainder of Section 8 is
separated into clauses that are divided by semicolons. 63 This creates a
list of enumerated powers that explain what is for the common
defense and in the general welfare. Had the Framers, therefore,
intended to separate the first clause from the following enumerated
powers, they would have used more than a semicolon. 64
After the initial section that gives Congress the power to tax and
spend, the enumerated powers are listed and each power begins with
“To.” 65 This shows that these enumerated powers are explanations of
what is in the common defense and for the general welfare. 66 If taxing
and spending for the general welfare and common defense were meant
to stand alone, Section 8 would have included these two things as part
57. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
58. Jaclyn M. Wells, Semi-Colons, Colons, and Quotation Marks, PURDUE
OWL,
http://owl.english.purdue.edu/engagement/index.php?category_id=2&sub_category_
id=1&article_id=44 (last edited Mar. 29, 2013).
59. Letter from James Madison to Andrew Stevenson (Nov. 27, 1830), in THE
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 2000).
60. Id.; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
61. Letter from James Madison to Andrew Stevenson, supra note 59.
62. James Madison, The Bank Bill (Feb. 2, 1791), in THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION, (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 2000).
63. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
64. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison).
65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
66. James Madison, supra note 62.
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of the list. For example, Section 8 would have begun by giving
Congress the power to tax without including that this power is to
“provide for the common Defen[s]e and general Welfare.” 67 Rather,
if what is in the general welfare and for the common defense is not
limited to the enumerated powers that follow, it would have been
included as another enumerated power in the list. 68
Furthermore, not limiting congressional power to tax and spend to
these listed purposes would give Congress the equivalent of unlimited
power and the listing would therefore have been unnecessary. 69 If not
limited to those enumerated powers, Congress could tax and spend for
reasons other than to pay debts or for the general welfare and common
defense of the United States. 70 Congress would not be confined to its
enumerated powers and could interfere with powers reserved to the
states. 71 Instead, Congress would simply be able to justify any actions
in excess of those enumerated as in the general welfare and for the
common defense of the United States. 72
If these terms were not limited to the succeeding enumerated
powers, the terms would be unnecessary. 73 There would be no reason
to include the enumerated powers if the terms “common [d]efense”
and “general [w]elfare” were general terms not limited to those
enumerated powers. 74 “For what purpose could the enumeration of
powers be inserted, if these and all others were meant to be included
in the preceding general power?” 75 Therefore, the proper way to look
at these terms is as limits on congressional power to tax and spend.
“Nothing is more natural nor common than first to use a general
67. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
68. See James Madison, supra note 62.
69. Id.; PAUL, supra note 25, at 47 (noting that there would be no point of
listing the enumerated powers in Article I, Section 8 if they were to be included
within the broad definition of “general welfare”).
70. See James Madison, supra note 62. It would have been unnecessary to
include the subjoined “To” clauses if those clauses were not meant to define what
was in the general welfare or for the common defense of the United States. Id.
71. Id.
72. THE FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison).
73. James Madison, supra note 62.
74. THE FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison); see also PAUL, supra note 25,
at 47.
75. THE FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison).
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phrase, and then to explain and qualify it by a recital of particulars.”76
As such, what is in the general welfare and for the common defense is
limited by the section’s enumerated powers. 77
This argument is consistent with the Originalist belief that the
delegates at the Constitutional Convention would not have given
Congress unbridled discretion. 78 If not limited to those enumerated
powers, Congress would have so much discretion that it would have
the equivalent of unlimited power. Congress could arguably tax and
spend for any purpose it justified as being for the general welfare and
common defense of the United States. 79 This argument that
congressional power to tax and spend is limited to those enumerated
powers is supported by Jefferson’s belief that a proposed federal law
was unconstitutional if not listed among the powers granted to
Congress in Article I, Section 8. 80
The argument that the delegates and ratifiers of the Constitution
would not have given Congress unbridled discretion is further
supported by the “peculiar” structure of the federal government. 81
The government “combines an equal representation of unequal
76. Id.
77. See id.
78. See e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting that bills
of rights historically served to limit a government’s otherwise unlimited power,
which was unnecessary with the U.S. Constitution because it is “founded upon the
power of the people . . . [and where] . . . the people surrender nothing; and as they
retain every thing, they have no need of particular reservations”). Hamilton opined
that bills of rights were unnecessary to the U.S. Constitution because “[t]hey would
contain various exceptions to powers not granted.” For example, Hamilton thought
a provision granting freedom of the press was unnecessary because the Constitution
did not give the federal government the power over the press. Id.
79. See PAUL, supra note 25, at 48 (referencing Patrick Henry’s concern when
the ratification of the Constitution was being debated in Virginia). Henry was
concerned that the government could do anything it claimed was in the general
welfare. Id. In response, constitutional supporters noted this phrase did not
authorize such broad meaning. Id.
80. Id. at 45. Jefferson is quoted as saying that “‘Congress has not unlimited
powers to provide for the General Welfare, but only those specifically enumerated.’”
GEORGE M. STEPHENS, LOCKE, JEFFERSON & THE JUSTICES: FOUNDATIONS AND
FAILURES OF THE US GOVERNMENT 99 (2002); see also THOMAS JEFFERSON (17431826), supra note 42 (discussing why Jefferson’s opinion is highly relevant to what
the Framers intended when drafting and ratifying the Constitution).
81. Letter from James Madison to Andrew Stevenson, supra note 59.
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numbers in one branch of the Legislature . . . an equal representation
of equal numbers in the other” and “invests the Government with
selected powers only.” 82 These peculiarities were intended to be
safeguards against government persecution of minorities or
institutions.83 The peculiar structure of the government proves that
the ratifiers were apprehensive of “abuse from ambition or
corruption.” 84 Therefore, it is unreasonable to suggest that these same
men would allow the government to have unbridled discretion in
determining what was in the general welfare or for the common
defense of the United States.
Furthermore, the Framers would not have used the terms “general
[w]elfare” and “common [d]efense” if they were not limited to the
enumerated powers that followed those phrases. 85 If not limited, they
would be general terms. 86 It is hard to conclude that such general
terms would be used in the Constitution, when the Framers were
otherwise so precise. 87
Limiting what is in the general welfare and for the common
defense of the United States to those enumerated powers is also
supported by the lack of attention the Framers paid to these terms.
Framers who were particularly fearful of a strong central government
never addressed the terms “general [w]elfare” or “common
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Letter from James Madison to Andrew Stevenson, supra note 59; PAUL,
supra note 25, at 47 (quoting Madison as saying that “[w]ith respect to the words
general welfare, I have always regarded them as qualified by the detail of powers
connected with them. To take them in a literal and unlimited sense would be a
metamorphosis of the Constitution into a character which there is a host of proofs
was not contemplated by its creators”).
87. Letter from James Madison to Andrew Stevenson, supra note 59. For
example, Article I, Section 8, specifically authorizes Congress to tax “for the
Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16. These
provisions would be for the common defense of the United States. Therefore, if
“common [d]efense” was intended to encompass anything Congress could arguably
say was for the common defense of the United States, it is nonsensical to suggest
that the delegates would have included these specific examples. Rather, it is more
likely that these examples were specifying what was for the common defense.
Letter from James Madison to Andrew Stevenson, supra note 59.
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[d]efense.” 88 “[F]or it exceeds the possibility of belief, that the known
advocates in the Convention for a jealous grant and cautious definition
of Federal powers should have silently permitted the introduction of
words or phrases in a sense rendering fruitless the restrictions and
definitions elaborated by them.” 89
A majority of the proposed amendments at the Constitutional
Convention were to “circumscribe the powers granted to the General
Government, by explanations, restrictions, or prohibitions.” 90 At least
seven states proposed one hundred twenty-six amendments for this
purpose. 91 These states “saw [the] danger in terms and phrases
employed in some of the most minute and limited of the enumerated
powers.” 92 However, not one state addressed the terms “common
defense” and “general welfare” as a source of concern. 93 It therefore
follows that the ratifying states believed the terms were “explained
and limited, as in the ‘Articles of Confederation,’ by the enumerated
powers which followed them.” 94
IV. CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY TO TAX AND SPEND IS LIMITED TO
THE “COMMON DEFENSE” AND “GENERAL WELFARE
OF THE UNITED STATES”
Congress has the power to “lay and collect [t]axes, [d]uties,
[i]mposts and [e]xcises, to pay the [d]ebts and provide for the
common [d]efense and general [w]elfare of the United States.” 95 This
section of the Constitution gives Congress the power to tax and
appropriate. 96 These are words of limitation and would not have been
used if they were “meaningless.” 97

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Letter from James Madison to Andrew Stevenson, supra note 59.
Id.
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936).
Id.
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The terms “general [w]elfare” and “common [d]efense” were not
novel to the Constitution. 98 These terms were carried over from the
Articles of Confederation. 99 They “were regarded in the new as in the
old instrument, merely as general terms, explained and limited by the
subjoined specifications.” 100 One way the Constitution altered the
Articles of Confederation was by providing the federal government
the means to generate revenue. 101 However, the Constitution did not
alter the purpose of that revenue and the terms “general [w]elfare” and
“common [d]efense” were maintained. 102
The following sections will show that the grammar and usage of
Article I, Section 8, Clause 1, as well as the intent of the
Constitution’s Framers and ratifiers, was to limit Congress’ taxing and
spending powers to the common defense and general welfare of the
United States. 103 They will also show that foreign humanitarian aid is
neither for the common defense nor the general welfare of the United
States.
A. Grammar and Usage Demonstrate Congressional Authority to Tax
and Spend Is Limited to the “Common Defense” and “General
Welfare” of the United States
“Words are to be given the meaning that proper grammar and
usage would assign them.” 104 In the words of Chief Justice Warren,
the Supreme Court does not “regard ordinary principles of English
prose as irrelevant to a construction of [congressional] enactments.”105
This canon and Chief Justice Warren’s insight show that the use of
semicolons and the structure of Section 8 limit Congress’ authority to

98. James Madison, supra note 62 (“These terms are copied from the articles
of confederation . . . .”).
99. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. VIII, para. 1; Letter from
James Madison to Andrew Stevenson, supra note 59.
100. Letter from James Madison to Andrew Stevenson, supra note 59.
101. Brutus, No. 7 (Jan. 3, 1788), in THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION (Philip B.
Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 2000).
102. Letter from James Madison to Andrew Stevenson, supra note 59.
103. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
104. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 33, at 140.
105. Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 150 (1960).
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tax and spend for the common defense and general welfare of the
United States. 106
The first session of the First Federal Congress further
demonstrates that the terms “common [d]efense” and “general
[w]elfare” were meant to limit congressional power. 107
The
representatives’ discussion of proposed constitutional amendments
demonstrated their desire to limit the federal government’s power. 108
However, no amendment or proposal was made regarding the terms
“common [d]efense” and “general [w]elfare.” 109 It is unreasonable
that men who “[criticized] and combated” the “many inferior and
minute powers” in the Constitution would ignore these terms if they
imposed “unlimited taxes for unlimited purposes.” 110 Rather, by these
terms, taxes were limited to providing for the common defense and
general welfare of the United States. 111
Consistent with the lack of concern of the constitutional delegates
and the First Congress, there was a lack of reliance on these terms to
justify congressional action. 112 For example, the First Bank of the
United States 113 was justified as being
of primary importance to the prosperous administration of the
finances, and . . . of the greatest utility in the operations connected
with the support of the Public Credit . . . which will entitle it to the

106. James Madison, supra note 62.
107. Letter from James Madison to Andrew Stevenson, supra note 59.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.; Justice Story also noted that Congress may only tax for the common
defense and general welfare of the United States. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 381-82 (1833), available at
http://www.constitution.org/js/js_314.htm.
112. See infra text accompanying notes 114-25.
113. The First Bank was “conceived in 1790” and created in 1791 to “help
fund the [United States’ war] debt and issue currency notes.” A History of Central
Banking in the United States, FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS,
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/community_education/student/centralbankhistory/ba
nk.cfm? (last visited Mar. 29, 2013).
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confidence, and be likely to render it equal to the exigencies, of the
public. 114

Hamilton noted the importance of a national bank “in dangerous and
distressing emergencies.” 115 It is noteworthy that Hamilton did not
support these justifications as being for the welfare or defense of the
United States. 116 Rather, he relied on the Constitution’s concern with
protecting property. 117 In his opinion, the First Bank would attract
foreign capital and provide consistency and stability. 118
Similarly, prior to the adoption of the Constitution, Representative
Wilson justified the constitutionality of a national bank in 1785 from
the text of Article V of the Articles of Confederation, “that for the
more convenient management of the general interests of the United
States, delegates shall be annually appointed to meet in congress.”119
Wilson looked at a national bank as a way of managing the nation. 120
He believed the Articles of Confederation authorized a national bank
because an “institution for circulating paper, and establishing its credit
over the whole United States” was within the “general powers” and in
the “general interests of the United States.” 121 Wilson was “justly
distinguished for his intellectual powers” and was “deeply impressed
with the importance of a bank at such a crisis.” 122 However, Madison
114. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE
TREASURY ON THE SUBJECT OF A NATIONAL BANK 3 (1790), available at
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/bankunitedstates/bankoftheunitedstates_hamilton_17
90.pdf.
115. Id. at 4.
116. Id. at 4-9.
117. See id.
118. Id. at 20.
119. JAMES WILSON, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE BANK OF NORTH AMERICA
(1785), reprinted in 1 JAMES WILSON, COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 64
(Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007), available at
http://files.libertyfund.org/files/2072/Wilson_4140_EBk_v6.0.pdf
(quoting
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. V, para. 1). Representative Wilson was
only one of six individuals who signed both the Declaration of Independence and the
U.S. Constitution. Id. at 2-3 (discussing Wilson’s impact on the founding of the
United States).
120. Id. at 64.
121. Id.
122. Letter from James Madison to Andrew Stevenson, supra note 59.
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found Wilson’s justification for a national bank “particularly worthy
of notice” because it shed light on the proper interpretation of the
common defense and general welfare provisions in both the Articles
of Confederation and later the U.S. Constitution. 123 Wilson justified a
national bank from the “nature” of the “union” and the “tenor of the
‘Articles of Confederation’ themselves,” without considering the
“terms ‘common defen[s]e and “general welfare’ as a source” of that
power. 124
Wilson’s lack of reliance on the terms “common defense” and
“general welfare” is of particular importance because, while preConstitution, the terms of “general welfare” and “common defense”
were carried over from the Articles of Confederation to the
Constitution.125 Thus, the rationales provided by both Hamilton and
Wilson would arguably work for the general welfare and common
defense of the United States. However, neither Hamilton nor Wilson
relied on these terms to justify a national bank. 126 This lack of
reliance shows the limitations of the “general [w]elfare” and
“common [d]efense” provisions.
B. Foreign Humanitarian Aid Is Not for the “General Welfare” or
“Common Defense” of the United States
The Constitution should be interpreted as reflecting “what an
informed, reasonable member of the community would have
understood at the time of adoption according to then-prevailing
linguistic meaning and interpretive principles.” 127 One limitation on
Congress’ authority is the qualifier that taxing and spending be for the
common defense and general welfare “of the United States.” 128
The Journals of the Continental Congress repeatedly reference the
general welfare clause being for the general welfare of the United

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
2011).
128.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 113-26.
BRYAN A. GARNER, GARNER’S DICTIONARY OF LEGAL USAGE 642 (3d ed.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
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States and its citizens. 129 With phrases such as “of these States”;
“frontier inhabitants”; “common benefit of the Union”; “the people of
these United States, by whose will, and for whose benefit the federal
government was instituted”; and “the interest and welfare of those
whom [Congress] represent[s],” there is no question that the general
welfare was of the United States and its citizens.130
Congress largely ignores this limitation that taxing and spending
be for the general welfare and common defense of the United States.
This is evident in the language of congressional legislation. For
example, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 states that a
principal objective of the foreign policy of the United States is the
encouragement and sustained support of the people of developing
countries in their efforts to acquire the knowledge and resources
essential to development and to build the economic, political, and
social institutions which will improve the quality of their lives.131

American history shows that foreign humanitarian aid was not
considered to be for the general welfare or in the common defense of
the United States. 132 In 1794, the House of Representatives addressed
the constitutionality of federal spending on humanitarian grounds. 133
French refugees fled to the United States in response to the French
Revolution. 134 Maryland’s legislature requested that the federal
129. See Journals of the Continental Congress (Feb. 15, 1786) in THE
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 2000), available
at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_1s1.html (last visited
Mar. 30, 2013).
130. Id.; Alexander Hamilton also noted the necessity of the Constitution to
advance the “safety and welfare of the parts of which it is composed.” THE
FEDERALIST NO.1 (Alexander Hamilton).
131. 1-A H.R. COMM. ON INT’L REL. & S. COMM. ON FOREIGN REL., supra
note 5, at 19 (emphasis added).
132. See infra text accompanying notes 135-50.
133. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 169-73 (1794). Though the discussion concerned
humanitarian aid within the United States, it applied to federal spending on
humanitarian causes in general, both domestic and foreign. Id.
134. Id. at 169. See generally OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE,
The
United
States
and
the
French
Revolution,
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1784-1800/FrenchRev (last visited Mar. 30, 2013)
(discussing the French Revolution, America’s involvement, and French emigrants in
the United States).
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government provide funds to aid the emigrants. 135 In response, James
Madison “acknowledged . . . he could not undertake to lay his finger
on that article in the Federal Constitution which granted a right to
Congress of expending, on objects of benevolence, the money of their
constituents.” 136
Madison distinguished the British Constitution from the U.S.
Constitution. He stated that the British Constitution gave the British
Parliament an “indefinite and absolute right in disposing of the money
of their constituents.” 137 In contrast, the House of Representatives did
not “possess an undefined authority correspondent with that of a
British Parliament.” 138 Therefore, while Madison sympathized with
the French emigrants, he believed Congress simply did not have the
authority to grant them aid. 139
Representative Giles also doubted that such spending was
140
legal.
He disagreed with those representatives who would authorize
spending based on “humanity.” 141 Giles stated that the proper
question was not whether such spending was humane. 142 Rather, the
question was whether, “under the Constitution, we have a right to
make such grant?”143
Justice Story also believed foreign humanitarian aid was
unconstitutional. 144 Story provides examples of expenditures that
135. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 169 (1794).
136. Id. at 170. James Madison “wished to relieve the sufferers, but was
afraid of establishing a dangerous precedent, which might . . . be perverted to the
countenance of purposes very different from those of charity.” Id.
137. Id. at 171 (citing an instance when the British Parliament authorized one
hundred thousand pounds to support Lisbon after an earthquake).
138. Id. at 171-73 (noting that the various state legislatures had “more
extensive” “power over the purses of their constituents” than is afforded to Congress
under the U.S. Constitution). Madison noted that “[h]e was satisfied that the citizens
of the United States possessed an equal degree of magnanimity, generosity and
benevolence, with the people of Britain, but this House certainly did not possess an
undefined authority correspondent with that of a British Parliament.” Id.
139. Id. at 170-72.
140. Id. at 173.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.; see also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 6 (1957) (noting that the
government may only act within constitutional limitations).
144. See 3 STORY, supra note 112, at 381-82.
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were not for the common defense or in the general welfare of the
United States. 145 He notes that purposes “wholly extraneous” 146 to the
common defense or general welfare of the United States included
“giving aids and subsidies to a foreign nation.” 147 According to Story,
such foreign aid and subsidies were “wholly indefensible upon
constitutional principles.” 148
Despite this history and the lack of connection between foreign
humanitarian aid and the common defense and general welfare of the
United States, Congress spends billions of dollars on foreign
humanitarian aid every year. 149 Foreign humanitarian aid is justified
for reasons that include promoting economic growth and reducing
poverty; improving governance; addressing population growth;
expanding access to basic education and health care; protecting the
environment; promoting stability in conflict regions; protecting human
rights; curbing weapons proliferation; strengthening allies; and
addressing drug production and trafficking. 150 Those justifications
that are related to democratizing foreign countries are arguably the
most related to the general welfare and common defense of the United
States.
Much of the time, proponents of foreign humanitarian aid do not
attempt to link these justifications to the common defense or general

145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. Justice Story also notes that taxing for the purpose of “propagating
Mahometanism among the Turks, or giving aids and subsidies to a foreign nation” is
not constitutional because it is not for the common defense or in the general welfare
of the United States. Id.
148. Id.
A power to lay taxes for the common defen[s]e and general welfare of the
United States is not in common sense a general power. It is limited to
those objects. It cannot constitutionally transcend them. If the defen[s]e
proposed by a tax be not the common defen[s]e of the United States, if the
welfare be not general, but special, or local . . . it is not within the scope of
the [C]onstitution.
Id.
149. U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Foreign Assistance Fast Facts,
USAID, http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/data/fast-facts.html (last visited Mar. 22,
2013).
150. LAWSON & TARNOFF, supra note 1, at 3.
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welfare of the United States. 151 When they do attempt to make this
connection, the connections are inadequate because proponents do not
explain how foreign humanitarian aid is for the welfare and defense of
the United States. 152 Any cause-and-effect between the aid and the
desired result is unproven and attenuated. 153
151. See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108-199, 118
Stat. 3 (2004) (justifying foreign aid spending for agriculture, rural development,
food and drug administration); Bretton Woods Agreement Act, Pub. L. No. 79-171,
59 Stat. 512 (1945) (justifying U.S. participation in multilateral development banks
for reconstruction and development); Support for Eastern European Democracy
(SEED) Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-179, §§ 2, 801, 103 Stat. 3, 26 (justifying
foreign aid spending to support East European democracy; only mention of U.S.
national security is Act’s authorization to allow President to cut off aid to countries
engaged in activities deemed contrary to U.S. national security); United States
Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2012, Pub. L. No.
108-25, 117 Stat. 711 (2012) (no attempt to justify this aid as being for the common
defense or general welfare of the United States); Millennium Challenge Act of 2003,
Pub. L. No. 108-199, 118 Stat. 211 (2004) (justifying foreign aid for “economic
growth and the elimination of extreme poverty and [to] strengthen[] good
governance, economic freedom, and investments in people”); but see, e.g.,
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-480,
68 Stat. 454-55 (1954) (justifying foreign aid spending “[t]o increase the
consumption of United States agricultural commodities in foreign countries, to
improve the foreign relations of the United States, and for other purposes” and to
“promote the economic stability of American agriculture and the national welfare”).
152. See, e.g., Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75 Stat.
424 (1961) (claiming foreign aid for economic development and internal and
external security promoted the security and general welfare of the United States);
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-480,
68 Stat. 454-55 (1954) (justifying foreign aid in the form of agricultural
commodities as in the “national welfare” of the United States); see also Andrew S.
Natsios, Foreign Aid Programs are Important for American National Security, U.S.
NEWS (Oct. 11, 2011), http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/given-the-currentdeficit-crisis-should-foreign-aid-be-cut/foreign-aid-programs-are-important-foramerican-national-security (making the conclusory statement that cutting foreign aid
will “diminish our position in the world as a great power” and weaken U.S. national
security); Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, USAID,
http://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/organization/bureaus/bureau-democracy-conflictand-humanitarian-assistance (last visited June 15, 2013) (justifying U.S. foreign aid
as “furthering United States national security broadly defined”).
153. Simeon Djankov, Jose G. Montalvo & Marta Reynal-Querol, Does
J.,
1
(2006),
available
at
Foreign
Aid
Help?,
26
CATO
http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-journal/2006/1/cj26n11.pdf; see also PAUL, supra note 25, at 18-19.
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1. Any Connection between Bilateral Foreign Humanitarian Aid to
the Welfare and Defense of the United States Is Unproven and
Attenuated
Proponents of foreign humanitarian aid claim this aid helps the
democratization of recipient countries. 154 Democratic countries are
seen as U.S. allies, 155 most recently in the War on Terror. 156
Therefore, a common argument is that foreign humanitarian aid
promotes the general welfare and common defense of the United
States by limiting potential adversaries and strengthening allies.157
Evidence from history does not give this proposition much support. 158
For several reasons, foreign humanitarian aid has little or no
favorable effect on democratizing foreign countries. 159 One reason is
154. SUSAN B. EPSTEIN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34296,
DEMOCRACY PROMOTION: CORNERSTONE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY? 7-9 (2007),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34296.pdf.
155. Id. at 8; but cf. id. at 10 (citing JOANNE GOWA, BALLOTS AND BULLETS
113 (1999)). Gowa argues that history does not support the so-called “democracy
peace theory.” Id. at 10. Rather, she attributes the so-called “democracy peace
theory” to similar interests and the “bipolar balance in the world after World War
II.” Id. Gowa also notes that “democratic peace [was] a Cold War phenomenon . . .
limited to the years between 1946 and 1980.” Id.
156. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 155, at 7-8; cf. Aloke Chakravarty,
Feeding Humanity, Starving Terror: The Utility of Aid in a Comprehensive
Antiterrorism Financing Strategy, 32 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 295 (2010) (arguing
that foreign humanitarian aid will help delegitimize terrorist organizations and
promote goodwill towards the United States).
157. See FPI Analysis: Foreign Aid Advances U.S. Security, Prosperity, and
Global Leadership, FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVE (Feb. 25, 2013),
http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/content/fpi-analysis-foreign-aid-advances-ussecurity-prosperity-and-global-leadership; see also Chakravarty, supra note 157 at
326 (arguing that “[b]y supporting development goals, such as educating
governments, building up civil institutions, and buttressing the economic
infrastructure, as well as humanitarian goals, such as reducing poverty, increasing
food assistance, and providing access to basic medical care, the United States[’]
interests will slowly, but deeply, be reinforced in the psyche of the citizens of the
recipient countries”).
158. For example, the U.S. government has provided foreign aid to Pakistan
for over 20 years. Adelman, supra note 2, at 65. Despite this aid, “anti-American
sentiment” in Pakistan has not diminished. Id.
159. Stephen Knack, Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy? 5, 15, 18-20
(IRIS
Center
Working
Paper
No.
238,
2000),
available
at
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that “most aid goes to [the foreign] government[] [rather than the
actual people in need], which “‘strengthen[s] the role of the
government in [the economy compared] to the private sector.’” 160
Democracy is not likely to result when the government controls much
of the economy. 161 Because foreign humanitarian aid strengthens the
government’s role in the economy, and because strong government
involvement in the economy hinders democratization, foreign
humanitarian aid does little to bring democracy to foreign countries. 162
Foreign humanitarian aid is, furthermore, an ineffective tool for
democratization, despite the often futile conditions that usually
accompany this aid. 163 Aid and the conditions on it may weaken
government accountability and the rule of law, 164 Government
accountability and the rule of law are two important foundations of
democracy. 165
Aid also “can reinforce ‘presidentialism.’”166
“Presidentialism” occurs “in new democracies [when a] weak
legislature provid[es] few checks on the president and cabinet, which
dominate political decision-making.” 167 Conditions on aid can give
the executive branch of recipient countries the power to “‘exact

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=260047 (noting that even aid
from USAID, which directs aid towards countries progressing towards
democratization, has no significant association with democratization); see also
Katherine Erbeznik, Note, Money Can’t Buy You Law: The Effects of Foreign Aid
on the Rule of Law in Developing Countries, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 873
(2011).
160. Knack, supra note 160, at 5 (quoting Milton Friedman).
161. Id.
162. See id. at 1 (noting that successful democratizing programs are rare).
163. Id. at 6 (citing INT’L FIN. INST. ADVISORY COMM’N, FINAL REPORT TO
THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE (2000)). For example, section 7046(c) of the
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012 conditioned U.S. aid to Pakistan on
Pakistan’s cooperation with U.S. counterterrorism efforts and Pakistan allowing
humanitarian organizations access to detainees, civilians, and internally displaced
people. SUSAN B. EPSTEIN & K. ALAN KRONSTADT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R41856, PAKISTAN: U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE 32-33 (2013), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41856.pdf.
164. Knack, supra note 160, at 5-6.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 6.
167. Id. (citing DEBORAH BRAUTIGAM, AID DEPENDENCE & GOVERNANCE 29
(2000)); see also Djankov et al., supra note 154, at 11.
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concessions from their legislatures.’” 168 This results in a shift of
power within recipient countries “‘that distort the constitutionally
established system of checks and balances’” that are required in a
democracy. 169
2. Any Connection between Multilateral Foreign Humanitarian Aid to
the Welfare and Defense of the United States Is Virtually Nonexistent
Foreign humanitarian aid through multilateral agencies is also
ineffective and similarly does not promote the defense and welfare of
the United States.
Such aid is ineffective partly because
“[m]ultilateral donors such as the World Bank are generally precluded
by their charters from explicitly advocating or promoting
democratization.” 170 Therefore, multilateral agencies are not allowed
to further the one purpose of aid that is at least arguably related to the
defense and welfare of the United States.
In addition to this limitation, multilateral agencies have a history
of ineffectiveness. 171 For example, the World Bank spent $180
million dollars on the Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline. 172 The World
Bank tried to prevent corruption by conditioning the pipeline on
Chad’s promising to spend the revenue on education, health, and
infrastructure. 173 This did not happen. 174 Once the Chad government
started receiving revenue from the pipeline, it “reneged on its deal
with the World Bank,” “weakened the regulation” that allocated “most
of its oil revenue to . . . poverty reduction programs,” and “diverted”
some of the revenue towards arms acquisitions. 175

168. Knack, supra, note 160 at 6 (quoting INT’L. FIN. INST. ADVISORY
COMM’N, FINAL REPORT TO THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE (2000)).
169. Id. (quoting INT’L. FIN. INST. ADVISORY COMM’N., FINAL REPORT TO THE
JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE (2000)). See generally Erbeznik, supra note 160
(discussing in detail how foreign aid negatively affects reform efforts).
170. Knack, supra note 160, at 3.
171. E.g., Djankov et al., supra note 154, at 7.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 7-8.
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Similarly, the United Nations (U.N.) gave food aid to Somalia in
the early 1990s. 176 It was not effective. 177 Indeed, “[d]uring the
famine of 1991 and 1992, warlords and militiamen looted a substantial
amount of the food distributed by aid groups . . . .” 178 Evidence
suggests that this looting resulted in Somalia’s civil war and
subsequent fighting over which faction would control the aid. 179
Despite this, USAID recently announced $20 million in new
American food aid to Somalia. 180
Thus, any connection between multilateral foreign humanitarian
aid to the welfare and defense of the United States is virtually
nonexistent for two reasons. First, multilateral organizations are
generally precluded from promoting democratization, which is
arguably the most related justification to the defense and welfare of
the United States. And, second, foreign humanitarian aid through
multilateral organizations has proven ineffective.
3. Neither Bilateral nor Multilateral Humanitarian Foreign Aid
Serves Any Purpose Directly Related to the Defense and Welfare of
the United States
Whether through bilateral or multilateral methods, foreign
humanitarian aid does not plausibly contribute to the defense or
welfare of the United States. 181 Democratization is the only
congressional justification for spending on foreign humanitarian aid
that comes close to being for the common defense and general welfare
of the United States. However, most multilateral agencies are
176. Marion Nestle & Sharron Dalton, Food Aid and International Hunger
Crises: The United States in Somalia 11 AGRIC. & HUM. VALUES 19 (Fall 1994);
Eleanor West, Stolen Food Aid Crisis Hits Somalia, FOOD REPUBLIC (Aug. 17,
2011, 4:01 PM), http://www.foodrepublic.com/2011/08/17/stolen-food-aid-crisishits-somalia.
177. Nestle & Dalton, supra note 177, at 19; West, supra note 177; Djankov et
al., supra note 154, at 8; Knack, supra note 160, at 6.
178. West, supra note 177.
179. Djankov et al., supra note 154, at 8; Knack, supra note 160, at 6.
180. Mohammed Ibrahim, Somalia: U.S. Promises More Food Aid, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 22, 2013, at A6.
181. See James Bovard, The Continuing Failure of Foreign Aid, CATO INST.
(Jan. 31, 1986), http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa065.html, for a discussion on the
ineffectiveness of foreign humanitarian aid.
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precluded from promoting or advocating democratization, 182 and the
previously mentioned evidence shows that bilateral and multilateral
aid are ineffective. 183
Examples of these propositions in action are the fairly recent
events in the West Bank and Egypt. The United States has spent
billions of dollars in bilateral and multilateral foreign humanitarian aid
for the West Bank and Gaza Strip alone. 184 Instead of promoting
democracy, both Egypt and the West Bank “elected” anti-U.S.
governments. 185 The Muslim Brotherhood took power in Egypt 186
and Hamas took control of the Palestinian Legislative Council in the
West Bank. 187 Each of these newly elected governments is antiUnited States. Therefore, any positive connection between the
182. Knack, supra note 160, at 3.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 155-81.
184. JIM ZANOTTI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22967, U.S. FOREIGN AID TO
PALESTINIANS
26
(2013),
available
at
THE
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS22967.pdf (noting that, since “the mid-1990s,
the U.S. government has committed more than $4 billion in bilateral assistance to
the Palestinians . . . who are among the largest per capita recipients of foreign aid
worldwide”).
185. Bureau of Counterterrorism, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. DEP’T
OF STATE (SEPT. 28, 2012), http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm
(noting that Hamas was designated a foreign terrorist organization by the State
Department on October 8, 1997); Erick Stakelbeck, Muslim Brotherhood: A Global
NEWS
(Feb.
1,
2011),
Terrorist
Influence,
CBN
http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/world/2011/february/muslim-brotherhood-a-globalterrorist-influence/ (noting that Hamas considers itself the “Palestinian branch” of
the Muslim Brotherhood); Mary Crane, Does the Muslim Brotherhood Have Ties to
ON
FOREIGN
REL.
(April
5,
2005),
Terrorism?,
COUNCIL
http://www.cfr.org/egypt/does-muslim-brotherhood-have-ties-terrorism/p9248
(noting that while Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood is not listed by the U.S. State
Department as a terrorist organization, Hamas, Jamaat al-Islamiyya, and al-Qaeda
are all designated terrorist organizations with historical and ideological ties with the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood).
186. Zachary Laub, Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.,
http://www.cfr.org/africa/egypts-muslim-brotherhood/p23991 (last updated Jan. 15,
2014).
187. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 155, at 10; The World Factbook, CIA,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/we.html
(select
“Background”) (last updated Mar. 21, 2013); see Profile: Hamas Palestinian
Movement, BBC (Dec. 6, 2012, 10:31 ET), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldmiddle-east-13331522 (discussing Hamas’ Palestinian victory).
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billions in foreign humanitarian aid to the welfare and defense of the
United States is questionable at best.
Michael Scheuer, head of the CIA’s Osama bin Laden unit in the
late 1990s, expands on this lack of a positive connection between U.S.
intervention and the welfare and defense of the United States.188
Scheuer notes that bin Laden’s followers are held together by a hatred
for U.S. foreign policy. 189 Thus, rather than humanitarian aid
contributing to the welfare and defense of the United States, Scheuer
argues the opposite: U.S. foreign humanitarian aid jeopardizes the
safety of Americans. 190
Robert Pape provides support for this argument. 191 Pape, a
specialist in international security affairs and director of the Chicago
Project on Security and Terrorism, 192 analyzed 462 suicide terrorist
attacks conducted between 1980 and 2004. 193 He noted that rather
than religious fundamentalism, the primary motivation of the terrorists
he studied was to force democracies out of the terrorists’
“homeland.” 194 Pape supports this assertion by noting that al-Qaeda
followers are ten times as likely to come from countries with a U.S.
presence. 195 These facts demonstrate that U.S. foreign humanitarian
aid does not have a positive effect on the welfare and defense of the
United States. Rather, it puts U.S. welfare and defense in jeopardy.
The Founding Fathers likely foresaw the negative effect that
foreign entanglements would have on the welfare and defense of the
188. PAUL, supra note 25, at 15, 18-19.
189. Id. at 18 (citing Michael Scheuer, Press Conference at the National Press
Club (May 2007)).
190. See id. at 18-19 (citing Michael Scheuer, Press Conference at the
National Press Club (May 2007)) (noting that Philip Giraldi, a former CIA
counterterrorism expert, agrees that the U.S. intervention has the consequence of
anti-U.S. sentiment and actions); see also Adelman, supra note 2, at 64 (citing
economists as arguing that aid incentivizes governments not to make changes as
long as they continue to expect aid from foreign donors).
191. Robert Pape, UCHICAGO NEWS, http://news.uchicago.edu/profile/robertpape (last visited Mar. 29, 2013).
192. Id.
193. PAUL, supra note 25, at 20. Pape compiled the suicide terrorist attacks
into a database and analyzed them for his book, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic
of Suicide Terrorism (2005). Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
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United States. In his 1801 inaugural address, Jefferson famously
stated, “Peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations—
entangling alliances with none.” 196 Washington similarly stated that
the United States’ “true policy [is] to steer clear of permanent
alliances with any portion of the foreign world.” 197 He believed the
United States should work with foreign countries in the commercial
arena, but apply its commercial policy equally and impartially without
special favors or preferences. 198 The more involved the United States
was with foreign countries, the more the United States’ destiny, peace,
and prosperity would become intertwined with the international
community. 199
V. HUMAN SUFFERING ELICITS EMOTIONS THAT CAUSE CONGRESS TO
IGNORE ITS CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
If foreign aid is unconstitutional, why has Congress continually
allocated billions of taxpayer dollars for it? Human suffering
naturally elicits strong emotional responses. 200 For example, when

196. PAUL, supra note 25, at 9 (citing President Thomas Jefferson, First
Inaugural Address (1801)) (emphasis added).
197. President George Washington, Farewell Address (1796), in S. DOC. NO.
106-21, at 27 (2000). Washington cited Europe as a prime example of why the
United States should maintain as “little political connection as possible” with
foreign nations. Id. at 26. Europe’s numerous foreign connections meant “she must
be engaged in frequent controversies.” Id. at 26. Therefore, the United States
should limit foreign connections to avoid foreign entanglements. Id.
198. PAUL, supra note 25, at 9 (citing President George Washington, Farewell
Address (1796)).
199. Id. (citing President George Washington, Farewell Address (1796)).
President John Quincy Adams would likely have rejected U.S. membership in
international organizations such as the United Nations. Id. at 13 (citing John Quincy
Adams, Speech to the U.S. House of Representatives on Foreign Policy (July 4,
1821)). Adams stressed that once the United States acted “under other banners than
her own,” it would not be able to “extricat[e]” itself. Id. (Adams also stated that
America “is the champion and vindicator only of her own. She will commend the
general cause by the . . . benignant sympathy of her example. [America] knows that
by once enlisting under other banners than her own, were they even the banners of
foreign independence, [America] would involve herself beyond the power of
extrication, in all the wars of interest and intrigue, of individual avarice, envy, and
ambition, which assume the colors and usurp the standard of freedom”).
200. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 202-33.
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discussing whether to aid French refugees, Representative Nicholas
agreed with both Madison and Giles that he did not know “upon what
authority the House were to grant the proposed donation.” 201 He
stated that while providing this “charity” would be “extremely
laudable,” it was beyond congressional authority. 202 Despite its
unconstitutionality, Nicholas admitted he would vote for granting aid
because of the emigrants’ suffering. 203 He reaffirmed his belief in the
unconstitutionality of the aid when he stated he would have to return
to his constituents and “honestly tell them that he considered himself
as having exceeded his powers.” 204
Emotions have not always resulted in the disregarding of the
Constitution. An example of this occurred in 1796. 205 That year
much of Savannah, Georgia was destroyed by a fire. 206 Though he did
not cite Madison, Representative Macon used Madison’s
constitutional interpretation to explain why the federal government
could not provide aid to Savannah. 207 Macon sympathized with
Savannah’s residents. 208 Although he felt sympathy for them, he “felt
as tenderly for the Constitution.” 209 The damage was confined to
Savannah and was therefore not “general” for purposes of Congress’
spending power. 210 Therefore, relief would not be for the “general
welfare of the United States.” 211 Because the Constitution only
authorized relief for the “common defense” or “general welfare,” it

201. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 172 (1794); see supra notes 134-44.
202. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 170 (1794); see also Chakravarty, supra note 157, at
310 (“humanitarian and developmental aid” is a “laudable moral objective . . . that
captures the spirit of [Americans]”).
203. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 172 (1794).
204. Id.
205. 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 1712 (1796).
206. Id.
207. See id. at 1717.
208. Id. Macon’s sympathy for those who were suffering was reminiscent of
Madison’s sympathy for the French emigrants two years before.
209. Id.
210. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
211. Id. (emphasis added).
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did not authorize this aid; Macon would therefore not vote to
authorize it. 212
Several representatives agreed that the federal government could
not constitutionally provide aid to Savannah because the government
was limited to spending for the “general welfare” and “common
defense” of the United States. 213 For example, Representative Moore
noted that individuals could contribute to those suffering in
Savannah. 214 However, it was not constitutional to provide federal
relief. 215 The federal government only has the power that the
Constitution gave to it. 216 Charity simply does not fall within
Congress’ spending authority under the “general [w]elfare” clause. 217
Proponents of authorizing aid to Savannah cited two examples of
when the federal government had provided what they called foreign
aid. 218 The first was when the United States gave aid to French
refugees from St. Domingo. 219 The second was when the United
States gave money to the daughters of the Count de Grasse.220
However, these cited examples were notably different from the case of
the people of Savannah. 221 For the French refugees, the aid was a
212. 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 1719 (1796) (Representative Kitchell also doubted
the constitutionality as well as the effectiveness of the proposed aid).
213. Id. at 1719-20 (Representatives Kitchell and Moore agreed aid to
Savannah was not general enough to justify aid under Congress’ taxing and
spending authority).
214. Id. at 1718.
215. Id.
216. See id. at 1723.
217. Id. In 1827, Congressman (and Colonel) Davy Crocket addressed the
unconstitutionality of federal government charity. STEPHENS, supra note 80, at 100.
He noted that individuals have the right to give their money for charitable purposes.
Id. However, Congress does not have the same power with the public’s money. Id.
President Franklin Pierce similarly believed that government funded charity was
unconstitutional. Id. at 100-01. In 1854, he vetoed a bill to “help the mentally ill.”
Id. He stated that he “cannot find any authority in the Constitution for public
charity. To approve such spending would be contrary to the letter and spirit of the
Constitution and subversive to the whole theory upon which the Union of these
States is founded.” Id.
218. See 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 1723-24 (1796).
219. Id. at 1724.
220. Id.
221. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 169 (1794); 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 1712-27 (1796).
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loan that was repaid to the United States. 222 In the case of the
daughters of the Count de Grasse, the federal government paid in
consideration of their father’s past services to the United States. 223
Therefore, these two cases were arguably authorized by Congress’
taxing and spending power. 224
These historical debates demonstrate how emotions can result in a
disregarding of the Constitution. This is likely the reason that foreign
aid for humanitarian reasons or in response to natural disasters is the
least contested form of foreign aid. 225
Closely tied with the emotional aspect of humanitarian aid is the
argument that the United States has a moral imperative to offer this
kind of assistance. 226 Proponents of foreign humanitarian aid argue
that foreign humanitarian aid “advances American moral values . . . by
saving lives, fighting poverty and hunger, combating infectious
diseases like HIV/AIDS, promoting education, and bolstering
democratic institutions.” 227 This argument ignores the duty that is
owed to support and defend the Constitution of the United States. 228
As Alexander Hamilton eloquently put it:
What is the most sacred duty, and the greatest source of security in
a republic? [T]he answer would be, [a]n inviolable respect for the
Constitution and laws—the first growing out of the last . . . .
....

222. 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 1724 (1796).
223. Id. The Count de Grasse led a French fleet at the battle of Yorktown
against the British during the American Revolution. Victory at Yorktown, HISTORY
CHANNEL, http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/victory-at-yorktown (last
visited Mar. 31, 2013).
224. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
225. LAWSON & TARNOFF, supra note 1, at 3.
226. Id.; Wiese, supra note 1, at 763; see, e.g., FPI Analysis, supra note 158
(arguing that foreign aid “advances America’s moral values”).
227. FPI Analysis, supra note 158; see also supra text accompanying notes
161-71 (discussing the ineffectiveness of foreign humanitarian aid in advancing
democratization).
228. See Act to Regulate the Time and Manner of Administering Certain
Oaths, 1 Stat. 23-24 (1789).
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. . . [A] sacred respect for the constitutional law is the vital
principle, the sustaining energy, of a free government. 229

Duty to support the Constitution was important to the Framers of
the Constitution.230 Article VI of the Constitution mandates that
senators, representatives, and executive and judicial officers of the
federal and state governments take an oath to “support the
Constitution of the United States.” 231 It was the first session of the
First Congress that specified the time and manner of these oaths. 232
One’s own idea of morality may not always be supported by the
Constitution. For instance, congressional representatives may decide
government-funded foreign humanitarian aid is consistent with their
own morals. However, the oath public officeholders take upon
entering office means that whether an act is consistent with one’s
beliefs is irrelevant. The question is whether such an act is
constitutionally authorized. 233
VI. CONCLUSION
John Quincy Adams proclaimed that rather than intervene, the
United States needed to respect the sovereignty of other countries. 234
The United States must abstain from intervention, “‘even when the
conflict has been for principles to which she clings as to the last vital

229. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, TULLY NO. III (Aug. 28, 1794), reprinted in 17
THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, AUG. 1794-DEC.1794, 159-61 (Harold C.
Syrett
ed.,
Columbia
University
Press
1972),
available
at
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-17-02-0130.
230. See U.S. CONST. art. VI.
231. Id.
232. See Act to Regulate the Time and Manner of Administering Certain
Oaths, 1 Stat. 23-24 (1789).
233. See 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 173 (1794). “Under the guise of interpreting the
Constitution we must take care that we do not import into the discussion our own
personal views of what would be wise, just and fitting rules of government to be
adopted by a free people and confound them with constitutional limitations.”
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106-07 (1908).
234. PAUL, supra note 25, at 12-13 (citing John Quincy Adams, Speech to the
U.S. House of Representatives on Foreign Policy (July 4, 1821)).
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drop that visits the heart.’” 235 Adams believed that while the United
States “‘is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all.
She is the champion and vindicator only of her own.’” 236 Rather than
intervene, the best thing the United States could do is provide an
example of true democracy. 237
Henry Clay reiterated Adams’ thoughts when he stated that the
United States should refrain from intervening in the affairs of other
countries and instead provide a “model” that other countries could
follow. 238 Clay noted that the United States served its own interests
and the interests of liberty by avoiding foreign attachments and living
according to its democratic values. 239
Despite the wise words of Adams and Clay, the warnings of our
Founding Fathers about foreign entanglements, constitutional
limitations, and the unwise policy of foreign intervention, the United
States provided 149 countries foreign humanitarian aid in 2011. 240
Unfortunately, neither the Supreme Court nor Congress is likely to
stop the unconstitutional practice of foreign humanitarian aid. The
Supreme Court is not likely to stop this unconstitutional spending
because it has held national security and foreign policy nonjusticiable
political questions. 241 Nonjusticiability means that Congress is

235. Id. at 13 (quoting John Quincy Adams, Speech to the U.S. House of
Representatives on Foreign Policy (July 4, 1821))
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 14 (citing Henry Clay).
239. Id.
240. John Norris, Interactive Map: Foreign Aid, Country-by-Country
Assistance for 2011, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS (Mar. 19, 2012),
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2012/03/19/11328/interactive
-map-foreign-aid/. Paul D. Miller, a former Director for Afghanistan in the National
Security Council under Presidents Bush and Obama, is cited as saying the United
States provides foreign aid to “select countries.” FPI Analysis, supra note 158.
Considering that the United States only recognizes 195 independent states,
providing aid to 149 is hardly selective. Independent States in the World, BUREAU
OF INTELLIGENCE & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Dec. 9, 2013),
http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/4250.htm.
241. See e.g., Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 US 763, 789 (1950) (dismissing
claims by enemy aliens that effectively challenged the propriety of US military
presence in China); see also Sarnoff v. Connally, 457 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1972)
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relatively unchecked in its foreign policy. 242 Congress is similarly
unlikely to stop this unconstitutional spending. 243 Therefore, because
neither Congress nor the Supreme Court is likely to do their respective
jobs of upholding the Constitution, it is up to the American people to
redress this unconstitutional spending. 244
Ending the federal funding of foreign humanitarian aid would not
mean, however, the end of all foreign humanitarian aid. A “Hudson
Institute study found that in 2006, Americans voluntarily contributed
three-times” the amount of aid provided by the government. 245
Therefore, proponents of foreign humanitarian aid do not need to
worry that ending government-funded foreign humanitarian aid would
end all U.S. foreign humanitarian aid. 246 It will only end aid that is
taken from Americans in the form of taxes.

(noting that foreign affairs are within the “exclusive province of Congress and the
Executive”).
242. See Christopher R. Chase, Note, The Political Question Doctrine:
Preventing the Challenge of U.S. Foreign Policy in 767 Third Avenue Associates v.
Consulate General of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 50 CATH. U. L. REV.
1045, 1045-46 (2001) (stating that the “political question doctrine limits judicial”
intervention into questions “best left to the discretion of Congress or the Executive
Branch”).
243. See supra Part V (discussing the sympathy factor that contributes to
unconstitutional spending).
244. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 33 (Alexander Hamilton).
245. Adelman, supra note 2, at 64 (citing the Hudson Institute’s 2007 Index of
Global Philanthropy); see also PAUL, supra note 25, at 102.
246. But cf. Natsios, supra note 2 (arguing that privatizing foreign
humanitarian aid is not a sufficient substitution for government-funded foreign
humanitarian aid because private aid “does not go to the countries and challenges
U.S. government policy makers deem central to U.S. national interest”). Natsios
argues that minimal private aid “supports democracy and good governance
programs” despite their importance to “build[ing] functioning states in countries
coming out of a period of dictatorship.” Id.
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The government works for the American people. It is therefore
up to the American people to ensure the government is abiding by its
constitutional limitations. If proponents of foreign humanitarian aid
feel strongly enough about foreign humanitarian aid, they can donate
privately or amend the Constitution consistent with the Constitution’s
Article V.
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